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Abstract: 
In the recent normativity literature, much attention has been paid to the question of 
whether rationality is normative. As rationality requires every agent’s attitudes to be 
logically consistent—and prohibits inconsistent attitudes—we might wonder whether we 
always have a reason to be rational. The normativity of rationality faces a strong skeptical 
challenge by Niko Kolodny (2005, 2008). Kolodny’s “why be rational?” challenge denies 
that we always have a reason to be rational. Andrew Reisner (2011) takes up this 
challenge and argues that—at a minimum—we necessarily have a strong reason to satisfy 
requirements of belief consistency and that this reason is parasitic upon evidential reasons 
for belief. In this paper, I will consider the possibility that some individual requirements 
of rationality always provide you with reasons to satisfy them. More specifically, I will 
critique the thesis that rationality issues requirements which are normative independently 
of other rational requirements. It is not clear whether a rational requirement, in isolation 
from others, always generates a normative reason to satisfy it. I will conclude that 
Reisner's approach may defuse parts of Kolodny’s challenge but only by introducing a 
problem of excessive justification for beliefs. If Reisner’s view is correct, full compliance 
with belief-consistency requirements will guarantee that nearly all of your beliefs—no 
matter what they happen to be—are justified to some degree.  
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I. What is rationality? 
The charge of irrationality is one that we take seriously. In everyday language, the 
concept of “rationality” encompasses not only the appropriateness of attitudes but also 
the appropriate relations among attitudes. The sense of “rationality” employed in 
contemporary epistemology tends to center on the appropriateness of belief in light of an 
agent’s epistemic situation. What one is justified in believing, we might say, depends on 
the features of one’s epistemic situation. Non-epistemological uses of the term 
“rationality” tend to focus on the logical or structural relations among attitudes. For 
example, an incoherent set of beliefs qualifies as “irrational” on this view of rationality. 
This difference in usage generates some confusion about the relationship between 
reasons for attitudes and the rationality of attitudes. To resolve this confusion, let us first 
become clear on what we mean by “rationality”.  
A helpful way of thinking about the different senses of “rationality” can be found 
in Niko Kolodny’s "Why Be Rational?" (2005). Kolodny claims there are three measures 
of an agent's epistemic situation which bear on the relationship between reasons and 
rationality: objective epistemic rationality, subjective epistemic rationality, and true 
beliefs.  
"Objective epistemic rationality" refers to having beliefs which are in fact 
supported by the evidence available to an agent. The definition of “evidence” used here is 
quite broad, including not only concrete physical evidence but also perceptual experience 
and abstract arguments. The beliefs formed on the basis of this evidence may be false, as 
even misleading evidence can generate reasons which justify belief. An example will 
help to illustrate this point. Suppose you are confronted with evidence which implicates a 
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disgruntled co-worker in the theft of office supplies. Suppose also that all available signs 
point to your co-worker having stolen the supplies, although in fact he had nothing to do 
with it. In the absence of distorting influences such as bias, believing that your co-worker 
is the culprit on the basis of this misleading evidence is supported by objective epistemic 
rationality. The evidence provides you with plenty of reasons to have this specific belief 
about your co-worker, and that belief is justified to some degree by the evidence, 
although the belief is false.
1
  
Often called “theoretical rationality” in the literature, “subjective epistemic 
rationality” is what we have in mind when considering the appropriate relations among 
beliefs. Consider a case in which someone believes p, pq, and ~q. Suppose all of the 
available evidence supports ~q, and perhaps ~q is even a true belief. But by believing ~q 
on the basis of the beliefs that p and pq, an agent is irrational on the standard of 
subjective epistemic rationality (hereafter, theoretical rationality).  
The logical or structural sort of rationality is often divided into two components, 
each of which governs a different part of our psychology. Theoretical rationality governs 
the appropriate relations among beliefs, whereas practical rationality governs the 
appropriate relations among attitudes associated with action, such as intentions and 
beliefs about means and ends. In what follows, I will be referring to objective epistemic 
rationality simply as "epistemic rationality." Throughout this paper, “rationality” will 
include both theoretical rationality and practical rationality unless otherwise specified.  
 
II. The normativity of rationality 
 
                                                          
1
 This account presupposes at minimum a weak form of evidentialism, according to which there are at 
least evidential normative reasons for belief. Believing in accordance with one’s actual reasons for belief 
is ideal, but we often do not live up to the standard. 
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In the recent normativity literature, much attention has been paid to the question 
of whether rationality is normative. As rationality requires every agent’s attitudes to be 
logically consistent—and prohibits inconsistent attitudes—we might wonder whether we 
always have a reason to satisfy these requirements. While some philosophers have 
focused on the question of whether rationality as a whole (that is, as a distinct source of 
requirements) is normative, Niko Kolodny and Andrew Reisner have considered the 
possibility that some rational requirements are normative whereas others are not. I will 
begin by sketching this issue as it is described by John Broome.  
In Chapter 11 of Rationality Through Reasoning, Broome attempts to answer 
what he calls the “Normative Question” about rationality: whether, if an agent is 
rationally required to F, that fact necessarily counts as a reason for the agent to F.
2
 Many 
of the major parties to this debate accept some form of “factualism” about reasons. -
According to the “factualist” view of reasons, there are facts about what one ought to do.3 
When an agent ought to F, that fact is explainable in terms of the reasons she has to F. In 
other words, in understanding why an agent ought to F, a number of reasons would 
jointly explain the “ought” of the statement, “N ought to F.” These reasons can issue 
from a number of sources, including prudence, morality, and perhaps others. Such 
sources are said to be “normative” because they provide an agent with normative or 
justifying reasons which count in favor of either Fing or not Fing. Another way of saying 
                                                          
2
 Broome, J. (2013), p. 202. Here and throughout, I will use “F” as a universal verb which includes 
“believe,” “intend,” etc.  
3
 In this paper, I will be following standard practice in using “ought” as shorthand for “ought, all-things-
considered”; that is, in every case in which one ought to F, one ought to F because the balance of reasons 
conclusively supports Fing. Likewise, I will use the phrase “have most reason to F” synonymously with 
“ought to F”. When it is not clear that one conclusively ought to F, but something stands in favor of Fing, I 
will simply note that there is a reason to F or that one “has reason to F”. So, by “reason”, I mean a prima 
facie or pro tanto reason rather than an ultima facie or pro toto reason.  
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this is that prudence requires you to F in certain circumstances; morality requires you F, 
etc. The way these normative requirements stack up determines whether an agent ought 
to F. Rationality is also a source of requirements, although it is not clear whether 
rationality issues normative requirements. The Normative Question asks whether 
rationality gives you a reason to satisfy these requirements.  
If we answer the Normative Question positively, we are committed to the thesis 
“Normativity of Rationality”. But we needn’t adopt such a strong view of the reasons 
attached to rationality, because there are two ways in which a source of requirements 
might be normative, either derivatively or non-derivatively. If rationality is non-
derivatively normative, an agent necessarily has a reason to satisfy rational requirements 
simply by virtue of being required by rationality, according to Normativity of Rationality. 
Morality and prudence are two sources of requirements which many take to be non-
derivatively normative. If rationality is derivatively normative, then an agent has a reason 
to satisfy rational requirements because of some normative source apart from rationality. 
The latter possibility, if true, would force us to accept something weaker than 
Normativity of Rationality. This is because the fact that rationality requires an agent to F 
would not in itself constitute a reason to F. The weaker principle is what Broome calls 
“Weak Normativity”: “Necessarily, if rationality requires N to F, there is a reason for N 
to F.”4 This reason could stem from any normative source, as long as there is always a 
reason to satisfy each rational requirement.  
                                                          
4
 Broome (2013), p. 203 
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The normativity of rationality as a whole is an open question and one which I am 
unable to answer.
5
 But given our collective discomfort with having incoherent attitudes, it 
may seem that at least some rational requirements are normative.
6
 In the next section, I 
will argue that the most promising approach to this question would establish the 
normativity of individual rational requirements, in isolation from other rational 
requirements. I will then consider a similar proposal Andrew Reisner (2011). Reisner 
argues for a thesis even more qualified than Weak Normativity, namely that the rational 
requirements governing belief consistency are normative by virtue of the reasons for 
belief provided by evidence. In other words, Reisner argues that several individual 
requirements of theoretical rationality are derivatively normative. Ultimately, I will 
conclude that Reisner's approach helps to defuse a prominent skeptical challenge to the 
normativity of rationality—but only by introducing an implausible view of how beliefs 
are justified.  
 
III. The “why be rational?” challenge 
 It is commonly accepted that there is a clear conceptual distinction between 
rationality and normativity. This distinction is motivated by the thought that one might be 
under certain normative requirements which are not identical to the requirements of 
rationality. For instance, if morality requires you to keep your promises, you are under a 
normative requirement to keep your promises. And it seems that this requirement says 
                                                          
5
 I will not consider the possibility, discussed by Nicholas Southwood in “Vindicating the Normativity of 
Rationality” (2008), that “the normativity of rationality is a matter of reasons that are internal to 
rationality, not reasons that are external to it” (18). Southwood echoes the response of H. A. Prichard to 
moral skeptics of his time: one cannot give an independent justification for morality—morality is self-
justifying. This response in the context of the current debate is less than satisfying, so I will not pursue it. 
6
 At least intuitively, one would be more or less rational by virtue of complying with more or fewer 
rational requirements. It may be that some rational requirements are “weightier” than others, but I’m 
unsure how one might determine the weight of a rational requirement.  
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nothing in itself about the logical relations among your attitudes. Accordingly, rationality 
is often taken to be supervenient on an agent’s attitudes, such as beliefs and intentions, 
rather than on features of the world outside of the mind. According to factualists about 
normativity, reasons are supervenient on the features of one’s actual situation rather than 
entirely on one’s attitudes.7 Hence, what is rational to do in a given situation is 
sometimes not what one has most reason to do, if reasons are, as factualists contend, not 
strictly supervenient on the mind.
8
 Let’s look at an example from John Broome which 
shows that rationality and normativity are conceptually distinct. The principle under 
discussion in Broome’s example is called “Enkrasia”, a principle of practical rationality 
which requires that [if you believe you ought to F, you intend to F]: 
Often when rationality requires you to F, Fing achieves nothing you have any 
reason  to achieve, stemming from any source apart from rationality. For example, 
suppose you believe you ought to sell your car, but your belief is false and 
actually you have no reason to sell it. You can satisfy Enkrasia on this occasion 
by intending to sell your car. If you do, as a result you will probably sell it. But 
you have no reason to sell it. Satisfying Enkrasia on this occasion achieves 
nothing you have any reason to achieve, stemming from any source beyond 
rationality.
9
  
 
Let us assume that it is psychologically possible to be completely mistaken about one’s 
reasons in this context and remain rational. Suppose you have the mistaken belief that 
you ought to sell your car. Rationality permits you to intend to sell your car, without 
giving you a reason to do so. In fact, prudence and perhaps other normative sources give 
you most reason not to sell your car. The reasons which determine that you ought not to 
                                                          
7
 Of course, this sort of account presupposes a satisfying answer to error theories about normativity in 
general. Given that error theories about epistemic normativity appear self-defeating, I accept that 
normative claims aren’t systematically false. 
8
 This is not to say that no rational requirements are normative requirements. At this point, to assert that 
rationality and normativity never intersect would be to beg the question against the normativity of 
individual rational requirements. 
9
 Broome (2013), p. 207 
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sell your car do not count in favor of doing something which rationality permits. 
Intending to sell your car in this case would satisfy Enkrasia sans any obvious moral or 
prudential reason to do so. Broome concludes that Enkrasia cannot be derivatively 
normative, because no source other than rationality gives you a reason to satisfy it. This 
sort of example can be constructed for many rational requirements and will produce 
similar results.  
 So, a theory which defends the normativity of rational requirements must meet the 
“why be rational?” challenge outlined in Kolodny (2005). For the purposes of this paper, 
I will consider two major components of this challenge: 
The net result of revising my attitudes in accordance with rational requirements 
might be to adopt many attitudes for which I have no reason, and to abandon 
many attitudes for which I have. In any event, even if it is true that we have this 
reason to comply with rational requirements as a rule, it does not follow that we 
have this reason to comply with them in any particular case.
10
 
 
The first component concerns having a reason in every particular case to be 
rational, which I will call the Universality Constraint. Unlike the rules of chess or the 
driving laws in Great Britain, rationality has jurisdiction over all agents at all times. So, if 
rational requirements are necessarily normative, they would—always and everywhere—
provide us with reasons to satisfy them. A common response to the “why be rational?” 
challenge has been to draw attention to the moral and prudential reasons we have to 
maintain rational dispositions, i.e., to be disposed to satisfy rational requirements. 
Dispositional theories of this sort are unable to meet Kolodny’s challenge, because they 
do not satisfy the Universality Constraint. In some cases, it seems that acting contrary to 
a rational disposition may be prudent, morally obligatory, etc. As a result, most 
contributors on the subject would find the following principle unsatisfactory: 
                                                          
10
 Kolodny (2005), p. 543 
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 D: More often than not, an agent has reason to be rational. 
 Someone sympathetic to this kind of dispositional theory might respond by 
agreeing that we may not have a reason in every particular case to be rational. But one 
always has a reason to maintain a rational disposition, and the surest way to maintain a 
rational disposition by always being rational. The following observation should cast 
doubt on that kind of response: Dispositions usually aren't threatened by individual 
instances in which we act or believe contrary to them. An agent might sometimes violate 
a principle of practical rationality without threatening her capacity for practical 
rationality. Similarly, an agent might sometimes have incoherent beliefs without 
threatening her capacity to make her beliefs coherent. And even if a disposition to F is 
generally more beneficial than a disposition not to F, it simply does not follow that one 
always has a reason to F. It suffices to say that even if there are reasons for dispositions, 
that fact does not entail having a reason in every case.  
A dispositional theory which might circumvent these worries could contend that 
one always has reason to be more rational than not.
11
 Might an agent have reason to do 
what rationality on balance requires? For example, consider two requirements which 
plausibly issue from theoretical rationality: 
Positive Evidence: Theoretical rationality requires that, [if you believe the 
 evidence conclusively supports p, you believe p]. 
 
No Contradictory Beliefs: Theoretical rationality requires that, at time t, you do 
 not [believe p and also believe ~p]. 
 
 Suppose you are irrational on both counts. You believe the evidence 
overwhelmingly supports p yet you believe both p and ~p. When you violate the first 
requirement, you could come to satisfy it by simply dropping your belief that the 
                                                          
11
 Niko Kolodny rejects dispositional arguments of this type in “Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?” (2008).  
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evidence conclusively supports p. Another option, one which would satisfy both 
requirements at once, would be to simply drop your belief that ~p.
12
 If an agent has 
reason to do what rationality requires on balance, it seems that she has reason to do what 
will satisfy the maximum possible number of rational requirements.  
 This understanding of the normativity of rational requirements rests on confusion 
about how reasons operate. When a normative source such as morality gives you a reason 
to satisfy a moral requirement, you possess that reason independently of your moral 
reasons to satisfy other requirements. Consider a straightforward moral case. As your 
only available driver, your friend has promised to give you a ride to the airport at noon, 
but your friend has also, forgetfully, committed to drive a different friend to a different 
airport at noon of the same day. It is clear that your friend, recognizing these conflicting 
duties, has a reason to fulfill each promise, regardless of what your friend ought to do, 
all-things-considered. Your friend does not only have reason to do what morality requires 
of her on balance but to satisfy each particular moral requirement. So, if the 
aforementioned requirements of theoretical rationality are themselves normative, we 
would expect to have a reason to satisfy each of them, independently of our reasons to 
satisfy the other. I will call this condition the “Local Constraint”. Both the Universality 
Constraint and Local Constrains must be satisfied for any individual rational requirement 
to provide us with necessary reasons to satisfy them.  
The second component of Kolodny’s challenge concerns the effects of revising 
one’s attitudes in order to satisfy rational requirements, and this aspect of Kolodny’s 
objection leads us to the heart of the problem facing the normativity of rationality: An 
                                                          
12
 Of course, beliefs normally do not admit of being dropped at will. This point will become important in 
section IV of this paper.  
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agent with inconsistent attitudes can revise his attitudes in ways which satisfy rational 
requirements yet violate epistemic rationality. It is important to note that this problem 
affects both wide-scope and narrow-scope formulations of rational requirements. So, 
before turning to the difficulties facing individual normative requirements of rationality, I 
will quickly sketch the difference between wide-scope and narrow-scope requirements. 
This will help to clarify some points made in later sections of this paper. The simplest 
example of a wide-scope rational requirement is No Contradictory Beliefs. No 
Contradictory Beliefs states that an agent is rationally required, at time t, not to both 
believe p and believe ~p. At time t, an agent can satisfy the wide-scope requirement by 
believing p, ~p, or neither, but violates the requirement only by believing p and also 
believing ~p. The wide-scope version of this principle can be reformulated as a 
conditional: At time t, 
RR[B(p)  ~B(~p)]  
That is, at time t, you are rationally required that [if you believe p, then you do not 
believe ~p]. This rational requirement lends itself to contraposition without any 
difficulties:  
RR[B(~p)  ~B(p)] 
All that is required of you is to make the conditional true, and this can be done by simply 
not believing p or ~p. By contrast, the narrow-scope version of No Contradictory Beliefs 
would restrict the acceptable ways of satisfying it to only one. In cases where an agent 
believes p, she is required not to believe ~p on the narrow-scope requirement. The 
requirement, reformulated as a conditional, would appear as follows:  
B(p)  RR[~B(~p)].  
13 
 
In cases where the agent believes ~p, she is required not to believe p:  
 B(~p)  RR[~B(p)] 
In other words, the narrow-scope requirement would be triggered every time an agent has 
the belief in the antecedent of the conditional. The scope of the requirement is narrow, 
because the requirement ranges only over the consequent of the conditional. Wide-scope 
rational requirements, by contrast, do not have to be triggered in this way in order to 
place requirements on rational agents. This is because the requirement ranges over the 
entire conditional. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that wide-scope formulations of 
rational requirements are more appropriate than narrow-scope formulations. Quite apart 
from the Normative Question, I believe that the objections to wide-scope rational 
requirements can be adequately answered.
13
 However, there has been less success in 
defending the normativity of individual wide-scope requirements. I will call this thesis 
“Individual Derivative Normativity” (IDN): 
IDN: Some individual wide-scope requirements of rationality are derivatively 
 normative. 
 
Much has been said about the implausible results of combining the normativity thesis 
with either wide- or narrow-scope formulations of rational requirements. My analysis of 
IDN will focus primarily on wide-scope formulations, due to the objectionable 
bootstrapping that immediately arises from narrow-scope requirements, if normative.  
                                                          
13
 For a strong defense of the wide-scope instrumental requirement, see John Brunero’s “Instrumental 
Rationality, Symmetry, and Scope” (2012). Brunero answers objections to (non-normative) wide-scope 
requirements of practical rationality and generalizes his defense to cover various requirements of 
theoretical rationality. Brunero draws a distinction between local and “all-attitudes-considered” 
rationality. It seems right to consider rational requirements in isolation from others in order to determine 
whether one is locally rational, so I am concerned here primarily with reasons to be locally rational.  
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 The bootstrapping problem for a narrow-scope rational requirement is that once 
the requirement is “triggered”—i.e., once you have the belief or intention in the 
antecedent of the conditional—you are required to do what follows. Once you believe p, 
you are required by rationality not to believe ~p. If this requirement is normative, then 
you always have a reason not to believe ~p every time you believe p. And when you 
believe ~p, you would suddenly have a reason not to believe p. If this were how 
normative rational requirements operated, a reason would be “bootstrapped” into 
existence by the bare fact of having a belief or intention. These reasons would exist apart 
from the prudential, moral, epistemic, and perhaps other reasons we generally take to 
support our attitudes. But, on the factualist view, reasons are not completely dependent 
on one’s mental states. By exchanging narrow-scope for wide-scope requirements, we do 
not immediately face the bootstrapping problem.  
However, the wide-scope “solution” to bootstrapping presents problems of its 
own. First, wide-scoping does not completely remove the potential for bootstrapping. 
This is most evidently a problem for practical rationality in cases of fixed ends and 
unalterable instrumental beliefs.
14
 Suppose you have a fixed end E and you are unable to 
drop the belief that to achieve E you must take means M. It appears to you, after much 
careful deliberation, that the only way to achieve E is through M. In such cases, the only 
way to be instrumentally coherent is to intend to take means M. But this is functionally 
equivalent to a narrow scope requirement for agents with these fixed attitudes, 
reintroducing the bootstrapping problem. So, normative wide-scope requirements of 
practical rationality seem suspect.  
                                                          
14
 See “Problems for Wide-Scoping” (2013), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-
instrumental/supplement.html>. 
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Andrew Reisner considers the possibility that, despite these issues, there is always 
a very strong reason to be theoretically rational. Reisner attempts to ground the 
normativity of theoretical rationality in the reasons provided by epistemic rationality. If 
evidence provides us with reasons to believe, Reisner argues, we always have reason to 
be coherent. One may be privy to only partial evidence supporting proposition p, but the 
available evidence always either does or does not support p. So in every case of 
contradictory beliefs, we can be certain that at least one of the beliefs is false. Let’s 
explore this argument in more detail.  
 
 
IV. State-given reasons to be rational 
 
Reisner’s defense of what I have called “Individual Derivative Normativity” 
(IDN) begins by introducing Derek Parfit’s distinction between “object-given” and “state-
given” reasons. A reason is “object-given” when it stands in a certain kind of support 
relation to the object or content of an attitude. Evidential reasons are commonly thought 
to be object-given reasons for belief, because the evidence supports the content of the 
belief. An agent possesses a “state-given” reason when something stands in favor of (or 
against) having the attitude itself rather than the content of the attitude. The most 
common examples of state-given reasons are moral or prudential reasons for belief. If it 
would benefit an agent in some way to believe p, then the agent could have a state-given 
reason to believe p despite having evidential (object-given) reasons against believing p. 
Some philosophers have argued that the reasons of rationality must be state-given 
reasons, i.e., reasons to have certain configurations of mental states.
15
 
                                                          
15
 For example, Broome (2013), pp. 87-88; Kolodny (2005), p. 550 
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Against this theoretical backdrop, Reisner argues that we always have a state-
given reason to satisfy consistency requirements (e.g. No Contradictory Beliefs) of 
theoretical rationality. Here is a brief overview of the argument: As contradictions are 
necessarily false, evidence will never support belief in a contradiction. This fact generates 
a strong, wide-scope evidential reason not to believe a contradiction. Conjunctions of 
contradictory beliefs are also necessarily false, which produces a state-given, wide-scope 
evidential reason not to have contradictory beliefs. The avoidance of contradictory beliefs 
is a wide-scope consistency requirement of theoretical rationality. Therefore, wide-scope 
consistency requirements of theoretical rationality are derivatively normative.  
On its face, this argument seems plausible. As evidential reasons necessarily 
undermine belief in contradictions as well as sets of contradictory beliefs, we always and 
everywhere have evidential reasons against having these beliefs. And this fact appears to 
support a specific type of rational requirement, namely consistency requirements of 
theoretical rationality. So, both the Universality Constraint and Local Constraint appear 
to be satisfied by Reisner’s account. But there are several ways an opponent could object 
to this argument, and the remainder of this paper will focus on the three most powerful 
objections. The first objection straightforwardly denies the existence of state-given 
reasons for belief. While I will argue that this objection is inconclusive, it is crucial to 
understanding the second and third objections that we cover the terrain. The second 
objection questions the inferential leap from non-contradiction to No Contradictory 
Beliefs, and the third objection focuses on the problems of wide-scope justification which 
are generated by Reisner’s account. The latter two objections, I will argue, are effective 
in casting serious doubt on IDN.  
17 
 
The first serious objection rejects the premise that there are state-given reasons for 
belief. Recently, there has been a trend in favor of calling object-given reasons the “right 
kind of reasons” and state-given reasons the “wrong kind of reasons”. Some authors 
allege that there is a kind of conceptual fit between reasons and the content of the 
attitudes which they support and that this fact constitutes a normative standard by which 
we can designate reason-types as being right or wrong.
16
 Reasons for belief and reasons 
for action apparently occupy different domains, as beliefs do not fall under rational 
control as obviously as actions.
17
 One reason we may want to relegate state-given reasons 
to the sphere of action is that evidential concerns are well-suited to the sphere of belief, 
whereas non-evidential concerns seem better suited for determining the best course of 
action. The lack of evidential reasons for action seems to confirm this suspicion. It has 
been argued that the concept of belief itself makes the existence of state-given reasons for 
belief implausible. Furthermore, Niko Kolodny and Nishi Shah have argued that 
purported state-given reasons for belief are actually object-given reasons for intentions.
18
 
They are reasons to intend, because an agent believes that it is worthwhile to cause 
herself to believe something independently of the evidence. And causing herself to 
believe is a process comprised of actions.
19
 But how we initially construe what a belief is 
for and how we interpret the difference between evidential and non-evidential reasons 
will largely determine the plausibility of the state-given reasons theory. Ultimately, I will 
conclude that the two most influential strategies for doubting the existence of state-given 
                                                          
16
 For example, see Jonathan Way (2012) 
17
 Although, see Pamela Hieronymi’s “Controlling Attitudes” (2006) for the argument that intentions are 
no more under rational control than beliefs.  
18
 Kolodny (2005), Shah (2006) 
19
 Reisner (2009a) labels this line of thinking the “causing yourself” argument.  
18 
 
reasons are inconclusive. It should become apparent that these two strategies are closely 
connected and vulnerable on similar grounds.  
 Consider the following example from Reisner (2011), a spin on the common 
“eccentric billionaire” examples from the normativity literature. Suppose that an 
eccentric billionaire will offer you a fortune if you would admire Alex, who happens to 
be “a lazy sadist with a poor sense of humor.”20 Alex is not an admirable person, and you 
recognize this fact. So, your object-given reasons to believe that Alex is admirable do not 
support such a belief. (Suppose for simplicity’s sake that believing Alex to be admirable 
is interchangeable with admiring him.) As a result, you will have to take some means 
toward coming to admire Alex if you would like to receive the prize. The prize is 
awarded for being in the state of admiring Alex, not for how one arrives at that state. 
Reisner concludes from this example that prudence provides you with a state-given 
reason to admire Alex, not an object-given reason to intend or cause yourself to admire 
Alex. The critics of the state-given reasons theory would conclude from this scenario that 
you have a prudential reason to cause yourself to admire Alex, regardless of how you do 
so. Moral and prudential concerns seem inherently action-guiding and therefore appear to 
be outside the scope of doxastic deliberation, deliberation about what to believe. 
 During deliberation about what to believe, we generally inquire into whether p is 
true, not whether it is beneficial to believe that p is true. It is fairly obvious that the 
concept of belief is essentially connected to the concept of truth. Attributing a belief to 
oneself is equivalent to thinking that one is committed to the truth of a proposition, not 
the benefits of being so committed. In short, the concept of belief itself consists in 
commitment to the truth of a proposition, however strong or weak that commitment may 
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be. In Shah’s terminology, the “deliberative question” of whether to believe that p is 
transparent in that it always gives way to the “factual question” of whether p is true.21 In 
deliberation about belief, we marshal arguments for and against p, drawing on whatever 
evidence is relevant to the truth of p.  
 The deliberative process may conclude in an intention to put oneself in situations 
where one is susceptible to misleading evidence or psychological pressures from others to 
believe. Perhaps I intend to become involved with a cult, on the grounds that parts of 
their belief system would be beneficial for me if I were to adopt those beliefs. But this 
does not count as doxastic deliberation, according to critics of the state-given reasons 
theory. It is an example of practical reasoning. In other words, because of the 
intermediary step between deliberating and believing—namely, intending—it may seem 
as though so-called “state-given reasons” are outside the jurisdiction of theoretical 
rationality and therefore cannot count as necessary reasons to be rational.  
The “strong evidentialist” view of reasons seems to undergird these reactions to 
the state-given reasons theory. Put generally, strong evidentialism is the view that there 
are only evidential reasons for belief. As reasons seem to come in multiple varieties, the 
strong evidentialist claim can be interpreted in a number of ways. Let us start with the 
least compromising version of this view, one that entails “doxastic involuntarism” or the 
total inability to modify one’s beliefs at will. According to this strain of evidentialist 
thought, evidence (or what we take to be evidence) causally determines our beliefs. If 
doxastic involuntarism were true, then all claims about having pragmatic reasons for 
belief would be mistaken. On this basic picture of belief-formation, we involuntarily 
believe p to the degree to which the evidence appears to support p.  
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Altering beliefs at will—in any radical sense of “at will”—may be 
psychologically impossible, but it nevertheless seems beneficial in some cases to believe 
contrary to (or without sufficient) evidence. However, even the benefits of a belief do not 
generate pragmatic reasons for belief, according to the strong evidentialist. As Shah 
notes, “telling someone it would be wonderful if he jumped over the moon makes sense; 
telling someone he has a reason to jump over the moon does not.”22 If consciously 
controlling our beliefs is akin to jumping over the moon—i.e., something which we are 
unable to do voluntarily—then perhaps there is little sense to be made of non-evidential 
reasons for belief. It is not clear what is meant by “voluntarily” or “at will” in arguments 
for doxastic involuntarism. But if “at will” simply means “immediately”, then doxastic 
involuntarism seems to rule out state-given reasons for belief but also less controversial 
notions such as lengthy and careful deliberation.
23
 
The position that one is only capable of believing in line with perceived evidence 
should not be conflated with the assertion that one ought to believe in line with perceived 
evidence. It is also important to distinguish what is psychologically impossible from what 
simply lacks epistemic justification. The doxastic involuntarist argument is not that, 
among the various types of reasons for belief, evidential reasons have some kind of 
normative priority over pragmatic reasons for belief but that evidential reasons for belief 
are merely explanatory. While I do not mean to take a strong stance on the ethics of 
belief, many philosophers accept some form of the “ought implies can” principle with 
respect to normative reasons for belief. And if we cannot exert any control over what we 
believe, there seems to be nothing justifying about evidential reasons for belief. The 
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burden is upon the strong evidentialist to show how coming to believe, say, via a belief-
causing pill (or brain injury) is less justified by our normative reasons for belief than 
believing p on the basis of relevant evidence. Doxastic involuntarism, by collapsing the 
normative into the explanatory, cannot do so. Thus, we need something weaker than 
doxastic involuntarism to explain why state-given reasons are not genuine normative 
reasons for belief.  
 However, if belief has any function apart from capturing truth—that is, if we can 
construe what beliefs are for as including more than simply aiming at truth—then it is not 
clear why evidential reasons are the only sort of normative reasons for belief. One 
needn’t take the hardline position that only evidential reasons are, in a causal sense, 
relevant to belief-formation through deliberation. It may be conceptually possible that 
one can “reason” from the benefits of believing p to the conclusion that p is true.  We can 
imagine science fiction scenarios where this is the case. The more important question is 
whether this reasoning process counts as defective reasoning. The normative criterion is 
needed to differentiate legitimate forms of reasoning from defective forms and justified 
beliefs from unjustified beliefs. For example, wishful thinking may lead someone to 
believe that there is still plenty of beer in the fridge after a long night of intemperate 
drinking with friends, despite having, as a background condition of his reasoning, the 
belief that he purchased only enough drinks to cover the evening; this belief would be 
unsupported, although the process which produced it might in some sense constitute 
reasoning. 
 Imagine a science fiction scenario in which agents can gain beliefs in ways which 
are wholly unencumbered by perceived evidence. Suppose that taking a certain pill will 
22 
 
allow you to believe that your success in life is valued by the universe itself.
24
 Perhaps 
you are aware that having this belief will be better for you in the long run, allow you to 
accomplish more in your life, more cheerfully than before, and you can take this pill with 
almost no negative side-effects. Obviously, there is much to be said in favor of taking the 
pill. One might argue that these beneficial aspects stand in favor of having the belief 
itself. As noted earlier, some have argued that what stand in favor of taking the pill are 
actually reasons to intend to take the pill, not reasons to believe what the pill causes you 
to believe. Considerations which would count in favor of this belief include certain 
metaphysical arguments about the nature of reality, the possibility of a higher power, etc.  
 Presumably, though, many believers are capable of higher-order reasoning which 
takes benefits of belief into account. And whether or not they are capable of directly 
forming a first-order belief B on the basis of those concerns, one can form higher-order 
belief A about belief B, i.e., whether one ought, all-things-considered, to have B. In some 
circumstances, what is most important to us (or most in line with our ends) is not the truth 
of a belief but the fact that we stand to gain something significant as a result of believing 
it. This is most evident in contexts of religious doubts, as in the famous example of 
Pascal’s wager. If you were convinced that adherence to a theistic worldview would 
improve your life (and prospects for the afterlife), one set of means by which you could 
gain this belief is to put yourself in a receptive mindset and become a regular churchgoer. 
Changing habits of thought may also be an effective means for altering what one takes to 
be morally objectionable beliefs. This sort of long-term habituation of belief is not only 
conceptually possible but familiar. Recognition that one harbors racist or sexist 
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tendencies may count as a moral reason to change one’s habits of thought to eventually 
eliminate these thoughts and their effects on one’s behavior. Similarly, the belief that one 
will survive a terrible illness may contribute to actually surviving the illness. And, if 
survival is one’s end, it seems that one has a prudential reason for belief. Designating this 
reason as an object-given reason for intention seems to beg the question.  
 Authors like Shah and Kolodny rely on what Mark Schroeder calls “high-handed 
arguments” against the theory of state-given reasons. High-handed arguments “presume 
on the strength of the obviousness of the object-given/state-given theory to be able to 
discern that no [state-given reasons theory] could even possibly be right.”25 Reisner 
echoes these concerns, noting that he has yet to find a knockdown argument against the 
state-given reasons theory which doesn’t beg the question against the existence of such 
reasons right from the start. Reisner argues that strong evidentialists view state-given 
reasons as the wrong kind of reasons without demonstrating on a priori grounds that 
something is clearly wrong with the prospect of state-given reasons for belief.   
At any rate, I believe that much of the resistance to the state-given reasons theory 
can be explained by our uneasiness about epistemic irrationality. Believing on the basis 
of pragmatic rather than evidential concerns violates normative requirements of epistemic 
rationality. There are circumstances in which a misappraisal of the evidence is excusable, 
but when an agent gains a belief in a way which is intentionally contrary to the evidence, 
we intuit that something has gone wrong. We may even go so far as to deem that agent 
epistemically blameworthy. But whatever blame is incurred as a result of ignoring one’s 
evidential reasons, it is open to the state-given reasons theorist to say that the agent 
ought, all-things-considered, to believe a contradiction if she can come by that belief by 
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something as simple and painless as taking a pill. If one could bypass the psychological 
limits on belief acquisition by taking a belief-causing pill, it is not clear why that fact 
could not factor into one’s deliberations about whether to believe p.26 
 To summarize this section, the two most persuasive strategies against state-given 
reasons for belief seem to be: 
1) Demonstrating that purported state-given reasons for belief are actually 
object-given reasons for intentions, and  
 
2) Showing that there is something about the concept of belief itself which is 
supported only by evidence (broadly construed).  
 
Both of these strategies rely on a strong form of evidentialism. But the strongest version 
of this view, doxastic involuntarism, is purely explanatory and seems to eliminate 
normative reasons for belief altogether. Doxastic involuntarism can explain how attention 
to evidence produces belief, but it fails to explain how evidential reasons for belief are in 
any sense justifying. Weaker versions can capture the normative aspect of reasons for 
belief but face the charge of question-begging. Reisner rejects strong evidentialism on 
similar grounds.
27
 Beliefs are subject to a kind of indirect control through intentions, and 
that suffices to cast doubt on doxastic involuntarism as well as strictly evidentialist 
accounts of normative reasons for belief. Hence, the strong evidentialist’s misgivings 
about state-given reasons are inconclusive.  
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Like the first serious objection to Reisner’s argument, the latter two are somewhat 
technical, but I believe the latter objections hit their mark. As discussed earlier, the 
standard examples of state-given reasons for belief are pragmatic reasons. Puzzlingly, 
after distinguishing state-given pragmatic reasons for belief from object-given evidential 
reasons for belief, Reisner posits the existence of state-given evidential reasons for belief. 
Regardless of what we feel about the existence of state-given reasons, evidential reasons 
appear to stand in favor of the content of a belief rather than the belief itself. That is, 
everyday evidential reasons are generally considered to be object-given reasons. If IDN is 
only true by virtue of the reasons provided by epistemic rationality, we can identify two 
major difficulties with Reisner’s argument. First, there is the logical question of whether 
a state-given reason can be logically derived from an object-given reason. The second 
problem is normative rather than logical. The results of Reisner’s account are mixed, as 
the existence of state-given evidential reasons to be rational may partially justify beliefs 
which are unsupported by the evidence available to a person.  
First, let us consider the logical question. Reisner contends that if there is an 
evidential reason not to believe a contradiction, then there is an evidential reason to 
satisfy a rational requirement. The important question here is whether we can logically 
derive a state-given evidential reason to have coherent beliefs—ER ~[B(p) & B(~p)]—
from the more straightforward object-given evidential reason not to believe 
contradictions—ER ~[B(p & ~p)]. Not only are complex beliefs such as [B(p & ~p)] 
phenomenologically different from jointly inconsistent beliefs such as [B(p) & B(~p)], 
but their logical structures differ. Reisner presents a proof which is meant to draw the link 
between non-contradiction and No Contradictory Beliefs:  
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1. ER ~B(p & ~p)    (assumption) 
2. ~ER ~(Ba & Bb)  ~ER ~[B(a & b)] (assumption) 
3. ER ~[B(a & b)]  ER ~ (Ba & Bb)  (2, contraposition) 
4. ER ~ (Bp & B~p)     (2, 3 modus ponens)28 
 
 Our attention should be focused on the second premise, which states that if we do 
not have an epistemic reason to be coherent, we would not have an epistemic reason not 
to believe contradictions. Reisner admits that the second premise relies on “the view that 
we can agglomerate under evidential requirement” and acknowledges that skepticism on 
this point will make the argument implausible.
29
 Such skepticism may be motivated by 
attempts to avoid epistemic paradoxes resulting from agglomeration of belief, such as the 
“lottery paradox”.30 The lottery paradox is as follows: each ticket in a 1000-ticket lottery 
has a .999 chance of being the losing ticket, so you have reason to believe that any 
individual ticket you buy will not be the winning ticket. If beliefs agglomerate, then you 
can reasonably believe that each of the 1000 tickets will not win the lottery. But one of 
the tickets will surely win. As a result, agglomeration of belief allows one to reasonably 
believe a contradiction on the basis of probabilistic evidence. And as non-contradiction is 
a basic principle of logic, we may be inclined to reject agglomeration of belief. Doing so 
will allow us to simply reject premise #2. And if we reject this premise, this leaves open 
the possibility of having an object-given evidential reason not to believe a contradiction 
without having a state-given evidential reason to have consistent beliefs. 
 Assume for the moment that we can derive No Contradictory Beliefs from non-
contradiction. It then follows that we have a very strong evidential reason to satisfy No 
Contradictory Beliefs, a wide-scope rational requirement. There are multiple ways to 
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satisfy wide-scope requirements, only one of which will be supported by one’s object-
given reasons. Supposing that the available evidence supports p, one has an object-given 
evidential reason to drop the belief that ~p in case of contradictory beliefs. But if there is 
a state-given evidential reason to be coherent—and this reason is an evidential reason—
then dropping either one of conflicting beliefs is supported in some sense by the available 
evidence. This is due to the fact that individual wide-scope requirements say nothing 
about the best way to satisfy them from among the options available to us. Additional 
evidential requirements may dictate the correct method, but we are concerned here with 
local rationality and the normativity of individual rational requirements (IDN). Local 
rationality permits dropping the belief that p, dropping the belief that ~p, or dropping 
both. Reisner’s account of state-given evidential reasons introduces the potential for 
conflict among evidential reason-types. In other words, in cases of contradictory beliefs, 
one can always believe in accordance with one’s state-given evidential reason by 
dropping a belief which is supported by one’s object-given evidential reasons.  
One might reply that I have merely described a conflict of reasons rather than 
anything objectionable about Reisner’s argument. Conflicts among reasons are fairly 
common; for example, in the moral case above, your friend has a moral reason to take 
one course of action and a conflicting moral reason to take a different course of action. 
Indeed, we are often conflicted about what to do or believe on the basis of conflicting 
reasons. A plausible alternative interpretation of Reisner’s argument might be that we do 
in fact have both state-given and object-given evidential reasons for belief. The former 
should be taken into account when determining what we ought to believe, but so should 
the latter. Neither completely determines what we ought to believe, so a conflict of 
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reasons does not necessarily sink a normative theory—even when those reasons are in 
conflict over the best way to satisfy a single rational requirement.  
The problem with this particular conflict of reasons becomes apparent once we 
remember that normative reasons for belief justify beliefs. If we understand evidence as 
providing normative reasons for belief, both object-given and state-given evidential 
reasons are capable of justifying our beliefs. For various reasons, we often mistake the 
evidential force of some considerations and come to have beliefs which are unjustified by 
our object-given evidential reasons. But the only ways to have completely unjustified 
beliefs, as a consequence of the state-given reasons theory, are to believe contradictions 
or have contradictory beliefs. Given that state-given evidential reasons are “very strong” 
reasons on Reisner’s account, it follows that every belief is supported by the evidence, as 
long as you do not also believe its opposite. Not only is this counterintuitive, but it runs 
against a common thread in epistemology, which is that evidence supports some beliefs 
and not others.  
 An example might help to clarify these points. Consider Bert, a patient in a 
psychiatric hospital. Bert is a limiting case of epistemic irrationality: Whenever the 
evidence appears to conclusively support p, Bert thinks that someone has tricked him into 
misinterpreting the evidence. And whenever someone has tricked him into 
misinterpreting the evidence, Bert reasons, the opposite of the evidence-supported belief 
is true. So, whenever the evidence appears to support p, Bert believes ~p. Now, suppose 
Bert is adept at recognizing what the evidence in fact supports, but as a result of his 
flawed reasoning, he tends to believe ~p when the evidence in fact supports p. More often 
than not, Bert believes contrary to his object-given evidential reasons but in a way that 
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constitutes a strange web of coherent yet unsupported beliefs. According to the state-
given reasons theory, Bert nevertheless tends to believe in accordance with his state-
given evidential reason to have consistent beliefs, despite being disposed to believe 
contrary to his object-given evidential reasons. The commonsense view of epistemic 
justification is that Bert is unjustified in the majority of his beliefs. The state-given 
reasons theory appears to say the opposite. We are left with the unsatisfactory result that 
no matter which belief an agent drops in cases of contradictory beliefs, the agent is 
complying with a normative requirement. That is, there is always partial support for one’s 
belief. This presents, on one hand, a problem of excessive justification of beliefs, and, on 
the other hand, an inscrutable conflict among evidential reason-types.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Reisner (2011) attempts to ground the normativity of belief-consistency 
requirements in the reasons provided by epistemic rationality. To show that some rational 
requirements are derivatively normative in this way, we must be able to specify the exact 
relationship between believing contradictions and having contradictory beliefs. For the 
former belief pattern, we have reason to drop this complex belief, because it is 
necessarily false. But a set of contradictory beliefs does not lend itself to this solution. A 
contradictory pattern of beliefs such as [B(p) & B(~p)] can be remedied in a number of 
ways. But an agent doesn’t necessarily have an object-given evidential reason to drop 
either one of these beliefs, as an agent’s evidential reasons seem to change along with the 
features of her environment.  
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Furthermore, making the reasons of rationality parasitic upon evidential reasons 
produces a strange result for a normative theory: any belief apart from contradictions and 
flatly contradictory beliefs is always justified to some degree by a state-given reason to 
be coherent. A belief could be produced by severe bias, wishful thinking, and poor 
reasoning—and also be false—yet be partially justified simply because an agent does not 
simultaneously believe its negation. The example of Bert and his strange belief system 
clearly illustrates this point. In short, Reisner’s account partially defuses the “why be 
rational?” challenge, but it does so by allowing for excessive justification of beliefs.  
This exploration of the state-given reasons approach has hopefully shown that, 
whatever gains are made by presupposing the existence of state-given reasons for belief, 
we have reason to doubt that IDN is true. Consequently, we may want to reject the most 
stringent of our original constraints, the Local Constraint. Doing so would open up a 
range of alternative explorations of the normativity of rationality. Nevertheless, as it 
stands, Reisner’s theory forces us to accept a counterintuitive conflict among evidential 
reason-types as well as the partial justification of nearly every belief.  
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